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The Emerging Powers and the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Regime 
Tom Sauer 
In this Policy Brief, Tom Sauer looks at the 
ambivalent  position  of  emerging  powers 
vis-à-vis nuclear non-proliferation and what 
this eventually means for the EU. 
The  world  balances  between  unipolarity  and 
multipolarity,  without  excluding  the  re-
emergence of a future bipolar structure. As US 
predominance  is  diminishing  and  China’s 
foreign  policy  is  (still)  restrained,  other  states 
have more leeway to act independently, within 
the limits of economic globalization. Although 
the exact contours of the future world structure 
remain  unclear,  the  rise  of  the  so-called 
emerging powers
1 seems to be a given (Hurrell, 
2007; Drezner, 2007). None of them are small 
states  in  terms  of  population,  territory,  and 
GNP.  
 
A common characteristic is that the emerging 
powers behave more assertively in international 
politics,  as  their  rising  economic  prosperity 
renders  them  more  self-confident.  I  define 
emerging  powers  as  states  that  show  the 
political will and the ability to intervene more 
directly  in  international  politics  (both  on  a 
bilateral  and  multilateral  basis,  e.g.  in 
international organizations), not limited to their 
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own region. Amongst them are China, Brazil, 
Argentina,  Mexico,  Egypt,  Russia,  South 
Africa,  Nigeria,  Iran,  Saudi  Arabia,  Turkey, 
India, Australia, South Korea and Indonesia. 
Institutionally, the rise of the emerging powers 
has  already  been  recognized  by  the 
establishment of the G20 that to some extent 
has come to overshadow the classic G8. All 
states mentioned above, except Iran, Nigeria, 
and  Egypt,  are  part  of  the  G20.  The  most 
ambitious of the emerging powers aim to have 
a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. 
Partly  to  reinforce  their  demand,  and  more 
generally  to  strengthen  the  voice  of  the 
“Global South”, some of them have started to 
form  informal  “South-South”  alliances,  such 
as  India,  Brazil,  and  South  Africa,  better 
known as IBSA. 
 
New  is  that  these  emerging  powers  also 
behave  more  assertively  in  the  domain  of 
nuclear  non-proliferation.  In  this  brief,  the 
following question will be central: how do the 
emerging states behave more assertively in the 
nuclear domain? More in particular, I will look 
at four emerging powers that have been more 
active  in  the  nuclear  non-proliferation  and 
disarmament regime over the last years: Brazil, 
South Africa, Egypt and Turkey.
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Brazil3 
Brazil  acquired  its  first  nuclear  power  plant 
from Westinghouse in 1971. Four years later, it 
signed  an  agreement  with  a  German  firm  to 
acquire the complete fuel cycle technology as 
well as eight pressurized water reactors. At the 
same  time,  there  were  suspicions  that  Brazil 
was working on a secret military programme as 
a  result  of  the  Brazilian–Argentinean  rivalry. 
These  suspicions  were  later  on  confirmed. 
However,  due  to  financial  problems  in  the 
beginning of the 1980s and the transition from 
an authoritarian state to a democracy in 1985, 
Brazil ended its military programme. In 1988, 
the  Brazilian  government  adopted  a 
new  constitution,  which  forbids  the 
manufacture or possession of nuclear 
weapons  and  the  financing  of  such 
activities. Three years later, Brazil and 
Argentina  signed  an  agreement 
underlining the peaceful nature of their 
nuclear  programmes,  and  established 
the  Brazilian-Argentine  Agency  for 
Accounting  and  Control  of  Nuclear 
Materials  (ABACC).  In  1994,  both 
countries  also  ratified  the  Tlatelolco 
Treaty, which declares Latin-America a 
nuclear  weapon  free  zone.  Brazil  joined  the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1996, and signed 
and ratified both the CTBT and the NPT (only) 
in 1998. 
 
From that point onwards, Brazil tried to push 
the nuclear weapon states to disarm. After the 
India-Pakistani nuclear tests, and together with 
seven other states
4, it formed the so-called New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC) in 1998. The original 
statement  of  the  NAC  reads:  “We  can  no 
longer remain complacent at the reluctance of 
the nuclear weapon states and the three nuclear 
weapons-capable  states  to  take  that 
fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear 
commitment  to  the  speedy,  final  and  total 
elimination  of  their  nuclear  weapons  and 
nuclear weapons capability and we urge them 
to take that step now”. Until recently, the NAC 
played  an  important  role  during  the  NPT 
Review  Conferences  and  UN  General 
Assembly  First  Committee  meetings.  At  the 
2010  NPT  Review  Conference,  Brazil  was 
amongst  the  17  countries  (including  the  5 
nuclear  weapon  states)  that  drafted  the 
disarmament action plan (Johnson, 2010, 4). 
 
At the same time, Brazil resists temptations to 
accept more stringent controls by the IAEA. It 
refuses,  for  instance,  to  sign  the  IAEA 
Additional  Protocol  (established  in  1997), 
which gives the inspectors of the Agency more 
leeway,  e.g.  in  undeclared  installations.  After 
complaints  from  Washington  in  2004,  the 
Brazilian  Ambassador  to  the  US,  Roberto 
Abdenur, replied: “We believe firmly it is not 
enough  to  have  an  increasingly  stricter  and 
narrow non-proliferation (agreement) without 
balanced movement, parallel movement, in the 
area of disarmament” (Sauer, 2005, 23). Brazil 
has also refused visual access to certain parts 
of its uranium enrichment facility in Resende, 
which opened in 2006 and made Brazil master 
the nuclear fuel cycle. Brazil also possesses a 
naval nuclear fuel programme that does not fall 
under IAEA safeguards. 
 
The most visible “non-proliferation statement” 
by Brazil was the deal that it was able to reach 
–  together  with  Turkey  –  on  Iran’s  nuclear 
programme on 17 May 2010 (Spektor, 2010). 
Under the agreement, Iran would send 1,200 
kg of its (under 5%) low-enriched uranium to 
Turkey;  in  return,  Iran  would  within  a  year 
“It is time that in grave matters of 
war  and  peace,  emerging  nations 
such  as  Turkey  and  Brazil  – a n d  
others, such as India, South Africa, 
Egypt and Indonesia – have their 
voices heard” (Celso Amorim)   3 
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receive more highly enriched (to 20%) fuel rods 
for its ageing medical research reactor. The rest 
of the international community, especially the 
West, blocked its implementation by imposing 
new  sanctions  on  Iran  in  the  UN  Security 
Council.  The  Brazilian  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs Celso Amorim reacted as follows: “It is 
time  that  in  grave  matters  of  war  and  peace, 
emerging nations such as Turkey and Brazil – 
and others, such as India, South Africa, Egypt 
and Indonesia – have their voices heard. This 
will not only do justice to their credentials and 
abilities;  it  will  also  be  better  for  the  world” 
(Amorim,  2010).  Earlier,  Brazil  had  voted 
against new economic sanctions against Iran in 
the UN Security-Council. 
 
While most observers do not believe that Brazil 
is seriously thinking about a nuclear weapons 
programme,  there  have  been  a  couple  of 
statements by Brazilian politicians over the last 
decade that point in the opposite direction. In 
2003,  Roberto  Amaral,  the  then  minister o f  
Science  and  Technology,  made  a  disputed 
comment  in  which  he  said  that  Brazil  would 
not renounce its knowledge of nuclear fission, 
the  process  needed  to  manufacture  a  nuclear 
device. The year before, presidential candidate 
(and  later  president)  Lula  da  Silva  had  made 
similar  comments.  In  September  2009, 
Brazilian  Vice-President  Jose  Alencar  said: 
“The nuclear weapon, used as an instrument of 
deterrence, is of great importance for a country 
that  has  15,000  kilometers  of  borders  to t h e  
west and a territorial sea” (Boyle, 2009). 
 
South Africa 
South Africa derives a lot of moral power in 
the  world  from  the  fact  that  it  is  the  only 
nuclear weapon state that has abolished its own 
nuclear weapon arsenal (in the beginning of the 
1990s).  However,  due  to  immense  pressure 
from  the  US,  it  did  not  use  that  power  to 
criticize the nuclear weapon states, but acted as 
a  bridge-builder  between  the  nuclear  weapon 
states and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
more in particular with respect to the indefinite 
extension  of  the  NPT  in  1995.  From  a 
disarmament  point  of  view,  the  indefinite 
extension of the NPT can be called a “pyrrhic 
victory” because the non-nuclear weapon states 
gave  away  the  main  leverage  they  possessed 
(Taylor  and  Williams,  2006).  In  1995,  South 
Africa also became a member of the Nuclear 
Suppliers  Group  (NSG).  In  1996,  Pretoria 
signed  the  Pelindaba  Treaty  on  a  nuclear 
weapon free zone in Africa. 
 
Since then, South Africa has moved to a more 
activist approach on nuclear non-proliferation 
and  disarmament  (Leith  and  Pretorius,  2009). 
In  1998,  it  became  a  member  of  the  New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC). South Africa has also 
been a member of the so-called Seven Nation 
Nuclear  Disarmament  Initiative  of  Norway 
since  2005.  During  the  2010  NPT  Review 
Conference,  South  Africa  was  a  staunch 
opponent  of  making  the  IAEA  Additional 
Protocol mandatory, despite the fact that it had 
signed the Protocol. It was also amongst the 17 
countries that drafted the disarmament action 
plan at the Conference. 
 
Interestingly, and in contrast to Brazil, South 
Africa  defended  the  US-India  nuclear  deal  in 
2008.  
 
Egypt5 
Egypt  obtained  its  first  (and  only)  nuclear 
(research)  reactor  from  the  USSR  in  1961. 
Other plans were cancelled after the Chernobyl 
accident  in  1986.  In  2010,  right  before  the 
Fukushima incident, Egypt again showed a real 
interest  in  re-starting  the  civilian  nuclear 
program.  
 
The  country  also  flirted  with  a  military 
programme in the 1960s (Rublee, 2006). Egypt 
signed the NPT in 1968, but ratified the treaty 
only in 1981. An IAEA report in February 2005 
stated that Egypt had failed to declare nuclear 
material and activities that probably dated back   4 
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to  the  pre-1980s  period.  Whether  the  latter 
points to a secret military programme is unclear. 
Most  experts  do  not  believe  so.  Nevertheless, 
former president Mubarak threatened on more 
than one occasion to acquire nuclear weapons. 
In an interview with the newspaper Al-Hayat in 
1998, he warned: “If the time comes when we 
need  nuclear  weapons,  we  will  not  hesitate” 
(Blanche, 1998). In 2010, according to Wikileaks, 
Mubarak  apparently  had  said  that  if  Iran  goes 
nuclear,  Egypt  will  follow  (Dziadosz,  2010). 
Similarly,  the  Egyptian  ambassador  to  the 
United  Nations,  Maged  Abdel  Aziz,  stated  in 
May 2010: “If others acquire nuclear weapons – 
and  if  others  are  going  to  use  these  nuclear 
weapons to acquire status in the region of the 
Middle East – let me tell you, we are not going 
to  accept  to  be  second-class  citizens  in  the 
region of the Middle East” (Grossman, 2010).  
 
Egypt  is  especially  known  for  its  active  role 
during the 5-yearly NPT Review Conferences. It 
delivered  for  instance  the  president  for  the 
conference in 1985, the first review conference 
the country attended. At the NPT Review and 
Extension conference in 1995, Egypt 
argued  successfully  for  a  separate 
resolution  that  envisaged  a  nuclear-
weapon  free  zone  for  the  Middle 
East, an idea that President Sadat had 
already proposed in 1974, and which 
was  re-launched  by  Egypt  in  1990. 
Although  Israel  was  not  explicitly 
mentioned,  the  1995  resolution  is 
generally  recognized  as  a  success  for  the 
Egyptian diplomacy. 
 
Egypt signed the CTBT in 1996, but it is still 
one of the few non-ratifiers in the world. It also 
refused to sign the Additional Protocol of the 
IAEA. These non-ratifications are linked to the 
status of Israel that has always refused to sign 
the NPT. Egypt did ratify the Pelindaba treaty, 
signed in Cairo in 1996, which turned Africa into 
a  nuclear  weapon  free  zone.  In  1998,  Egypt 
became one of the eight members of the New 
Agenda  Coalition.  At  the  2000  NPT  Review 
Conference, Egypt led the NAC and was key 
in  persuading  the  nuclear  weapon  states  to 
accept the so-called “13 nuclear disarmament 
steps”.  For  the  first  time,  Israel  was  also 
explicitly mentioned in a final declaration due 
to  pressure  from  Egypt.  Similarly,  Egypt 
played a dominant role during the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference. Together with Iran (and 
the  US,  according  to  non-Western 
participants),  it  was  blamed  for  the 
conference’s failure. Five years later, Rebecca 
Johnson  described  Egypt  – a t  that  time  not 
only  leading  the  NAC,  but  also  the  Non-
Aligned Movement (and the Arab League) – as 
“the  most  influential  player  among  the  non-
nuclear  weapon  states  in  constructing  the 
[successful] 2010 outcome” (Johnson, 2010, 3). 
The  Egyptian  ambassador  at  the  Conference 
for  instance  stated:  “We  are  not  going  to 
accept  that  each  time  there  is  progress  on 
disarmament  that  we  have  to  take  more 
obligations  on  our  side”  (Ogilvie-White  and 
Santoro, 2011).  
This  time,  Egypt  succeeded  in  obtaining  an 
agreement on a concrete date for a conference 
about a weapons of mass destruction free zone 
in  the  Middle  East:  2012.  In  addition,  and 
again  due  to  Egypt’s  insistence,  Israel  was 
again mentioned in the final declaration. Like 
Brazil and South Africa, Egypt was amongst 
the 17 countries that drafted the disarmament 
action  plan  at  the  Conference.  At  the  same 
time,  it  succeeded  in  convincing  the  NAM, 
especially Iran, in not demanding more. 
 
It remains to be seen what the consequences 
of the Arab Spring – the end of the Mubarak 
regime  –  will  be  for  Egypt’s  nuclear  non-
“we  are  not  going  to  accept  to  be 
second-class  citizens  in  the  region 
of  the  Middle  East”  (Egyptian 
Ambassador to the UN)   5 
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proliferation  and  disarmament  stance.  In  the 
past,  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  that  may 
convince a substantial part of the electorate in 
November 2011, has spoken out in favour of a 
military  nuclear  programme  because  of  Iran 
(Grossman, 2011). 
 
Turkey 
Turkey is a NATO member that still hosts US 
tactical nuclear weapons on its soil, and that may 
host a radar for NATO’s missile defense system. 
It has no nuclear reactors (apart from research 
reactors  since  1962).  Turkey  has  signed  the 
Additional Protocol of the IAEA. In 2007, the 
government  passed  legislation  approving  the 
construction of nuclear reactors. It remains to be 
seen  to  what  extent  these  plans  will  be 
implemented,  as  there  was  already  substantial 
opposition even before Fukushima.  
 
Only since Erdogan and his AKP party are in 
power  (since  2002),  and  as  a  result  of  a  fast-
growing  economy,  has  Turkey  behaved  more 
self-consciously  and  assertively  in  international 
politics  (Larrabee,  2010).  For  instance,  Turkey 
did not support the Bush administration in its 
war  against  Iraq.  Behind  this  policy  shift  is 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoglu, a former 
Professor  of  international  relations.  He 
introduced  a  “zero  problems  with  our 
neighbours”  strategy,  while  at  the  same  time 
keeping good (although less dependent) relations 
with the West. Above all, he wants to see Turkey 
as  a  key  (instead  of  a  peripheral)  actor  in  the 
Middle East. The most visible actions were the 
support  for  the  Gaza  flotilla  (in  the  realm  of 
foreign  policy)  and  the  Brazilian-Turkish-Iran 
deal  (in  the  nuclear  non-proliferation  sphere), 
both  in  May  2010.  Turkey  is  not  a  fervent 
supporter  of  sanctions  vis-à-vis  Iran  either, 
including  voting  against  in  the  UN  Security-
Council;  it  also  blocked  consensus  within 
NATO in 2010 on mentioning Iran as the main 
target  for  NATO’s  missile  defense  system. 
Turkey  also  resisted  the  introduction  of  more 
intrusive rules by the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
with respect to the export of enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities (Hibbs, 2010); the NSG 
finally  gave  in  to  Turkey’s  demands  in  June 
2011.  
 
Because  of  Iran  and  because  the  US  tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe may be withdrawn 
in the foreseeable future, there is an ongoing 
debate  in  the  literature  whether  Turkey  will 
acquire  its  own  nuclear  arsenal.  While  this 
option  cannot  be  ruled  out,  most  experts 
believe  that  Turkey  will  not  do  so  (Udum, 
2010).  In  principle  Turkey  is  in  favour  of  a 
weapons of mass destruction free zone in the 
Middle  East.  In  2010,  Turkey  also  joined  a 
group  of  10  countries,  including  Japan, 
Australia, and Germany, that supports the idea 
of a world without nuclear weapons.  
 
Conclusion 
The  emerging  powers  seem  to  be  in  an 
awkward position. They perceive themselves as 
rising powers that should be awarded positions 
that  reflect  their  enhanced  power  in  the 
international order. Most of them – a notable 
exception is South Africa – still see a positive 
link  between  nuclear  weapons  and  a  state’s 
position  in  the  power  hierarchy  of  states. 
Although most emerging states are bound by 
the  NPT  as  non-nuclear  weapon  states,  they 
may  in  the  end  consider  acquiring  nuclear 
weapons for reasons of confirming their status 
(Campbell, 2004). 
 
These emerging powers follow a double-track 
approach  that  at  first  sight  seems  not  very 
consistent:  on  the  one  hand,  they  are  at  the 
vanguard pushing the nuclear weapon states to 
disarm.  On  the  other  hand,  the  emerging 
powers  seem  to  resist  pressure  from  the 
nuclear weapon states – especially the US, the 
UK,  and  France  –  to  counter  proliferation. 
One of the reasons is that there is a growing 
interest  in  many  of  these  rising  powers  in 
nuclear energy, while this interest was (or has 
been temporarily) absent in the past. A robust   6 
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nuclear energy programme may enable them to 
acquire the technical capacities that are needed 
to produce nuclear weapons.  
 
The  major  lesson  for  the  European  Union  in 
dealing with the emerging powers in the domain 
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is 
to  become  familiar  with  their  (sometimes 
changing)  points  of  view,  which  are  not  only 
influenced  by  their  location  and  threat 
assessment,  but  also  their  (self-perceived) 
history,  and  their  perception  of  the  current 
international  political  system  and  of  the 
remaining  role  of  nuclear  weapons.  The  EU 
should and can do better than its approach vis-
à-vis Iran (Sauer, 2007). 
 
Tom  SAUER i s  Assistant  Professor  in 
International  Politics,  Universiteit 
Antwerpen. 
Endnotes 
1 O t h e r  n a m e s  a r e  n e w  p o w e r s ,  r i s i n g  p o w e r s ,  p i v o t a l  
powers, and – more confusingly - middle powers. 
 
2 The following categories of emerging powers have been 
a priori excluded: highly industrialised, “Western” states 
(Australia, South Korea); “official” and de facto nuclear 
weapon states (China, Russia, India), and aspiring nuclear 
weapon states (Iran). 
 
3 For this part, I rely partly on the master thesis written by 
Kirsten  Arnauts,  supervised  by  myself,  Challenges  to  the 
Nuclear  Non-proliferation  Regime:  Brazilian  objections  and 
frustrations,  Master-na-Master  Internationale  Betrekkingen 
en Diplomatie, Universiteit Antwerpen, 2010. 
 
4 Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zeeland, Slovenia, 
South Africa and Sweden. 
 
5 For this part, I rely partly on the master thesis written by 
Olivier  Philipsen,  supervised  by  myself,  De  verhoogde 
assertiviteitsgraad  van  Egypte  in  het  nucleaire  non-proliferatie  en 
ontwapeningsregime,  Master-na-Master  Internationale 
Betrekkingen  en  Diplomatie,  Universiteit  Antwerpen, 
2011. 
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